Why are some people more successful at forming true beliefs than others? This book challenges explanations that appeal exclusively to either intellectual virtues or to features of epistemic environments, or to simple combinations of these. It is argued that these approaches are not only compatible but complementary in explaining epistemic success and failure.

Against orthodox responsibilist views that define intellectual virtue through motivation to acquire knowledge and related goods, Keith Raymond Harris proposes that intellectual virtue involves respect for epistemic goods. This reconceptualization better captures the social dimensions of intellectual virtue and explains why virtuous agents sometimes avoid pursuing or sharing knowledge. He demonstrates that intellectual virtues both depend on healthy epistemic environments for success and motivate agents to improve these environments. Harris argues that intellectually virtuous individuals actively shape their epistemic surroundings through discretion, exactingness, and support for institutions. Drawing on contemporary issues including conspiracy theories, epistemic trespassing, and misinformation, this book unites two vibrant areas of epistemology while addressing both theoretical foundations and practical applications.

Intellectual Virtue and Epistemic Environmentalism will appeal to researchers and graduate students working in ethics and epistemology.